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The standard residential mortgage contract is due for a reappraisal in
light of today’s mortgage lending and regulatory environment. The goals of
Dodd-Frank and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have been
geared toward creating better stability in the residential mortgage market,
in part, by mandating more robust underwriting. This is achieved chiefly
through the ability-to-repay rules and the “qualified mortgage” safe har-
bor, which call for very conservative underwriting criteria to be applied to
new mortgage loans. Lenders are whole-heartedly embracing these criteria
in their loan originations—in the fourth quarter of 2015 over 98% of all
new residential loans were qualified mortgages, thus resulting in a new
wave of homeowners that are less likely than ever before to default. As a
result, the standard form residential mortgage contract, with its harsh terms
and overreaching provisions in favor of the lender, should be reformed.
This is necessary not only due to the fact that such terms should no longer
be needed since borrowers are better financially positioned than in the past,
but also because of a disturbing trend in the past few years where lenders
and their third party contractors have abused the powers accorded to them
by the mortgage contract—mostly through break-in style foreclosures. This
Article argues for a reformation of the standard residential mortgage con-
tract and specifically singles out three common provisions that are ripe for
modification or removal.
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INTRODUCTION
THERE’S no place like home.1 Indeed, the dream of homeowner-ship has been, and continues to be, a cornerstone of American lawand policy making.2 For instance, the law accords homeowners a
host of rights when it comes to criminal liability, damages in tort, tax
treatment, property law-based protections, and constitutional guaran-
tees.3 Moreover, policymakers focus on homeownership as a way to ad-
vance social and economic goals.4 Purchasing a home is encouraged by
public spending on federal and state programs that seek to open credit
1. NOEL LANGLEY, FLORENCE RYERSON & EDGAR ALLEN WOOLF, THE WIZARD OF
OZ 148 (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939 (based on L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZ-
ARD OF OZ (1900); JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, CLARI: OR, THE MAID OF MILAN 8 (1823)).
2. CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOME-
OWNERSHIP (William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson eds., Cornell Univ. Press 2007); JOHAN
NORBERG, FINANCIAL FIASCO: HOW AMERICA’S INFATUATION WITH HOMEOWNERSHIP
AND EASY MONEY CREATED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS (Cato Inst. 2009).
3. See infra Part I.B. and accompanying discussion.
4. See ERIC S. BELSKY, THE DREAM LIVES ON: THE FUTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN
AMERICA 13-15 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard Univ. 2013), http://www
.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w13-1_belsky_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/928M-
M76C].
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markets to would-be borrowers.5 Municipal planning exercises are fo-
cused on engineering livable spaces and creating strategically zoned buff-
ers to ensure residential areas are protected from other uses,6 while large
enterprises backed by the credit of the United States government have
been formed for the sole purpose of promoting homeownership.7 And in
the wake of natural disasters, government spending and policy rhetoric
focuses on rebuilding and bringing people back “home.”8 In fact,
America’s entire economic and political history is rife with examples of
“[p]ublic interventions in the housing market” based on the notion that
good housing policy stands for good public policy overall.9
Moreover, it is not only law and policy that favor homeownership, but
society and popular culture as well. Notions of success and images of in-
dependence and achievement are acutely focused on homeownership.
Proponents assert that those who own their homes have a propensity to
be more invested in their communities and, thus, better citizens.10 From
an economic perspective, equity in one’s home is espoused as being the
safest and most certain way to transmit wealth from one generation to the
next.11 The purchase of a home is viewed as a good investment and as a
corollary to income success.12 Ownership of one’s home is lauded as be-
ing the best adjunct to the successful rearing of children, the maintenance
5. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (3d ed. 2014);
see also MARTIN NEIL BAILY, THE FUTURE OF HOUSING FINANCE: RESTRUCTURING THE
U.S. RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET (Brookings Inst. Press 2011).
6. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (8th ed. 2012); Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex,
But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the First Amendment, and Residential and
Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 626–27 (2005); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s
Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1797, 1818–21, 1823–25 (2007).
7. Nathan A. Hertzog, VII. Regulatory Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 62, 64–68 (2011); Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, TIME (July 14, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1822766,00.html [http://perma.cc/J7LW-PFHY]; VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUAR-
ANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FI-
NANCE 7, 14–15, 27–28 (Princeton Univ. Press 2011); see also generally OONAGH
MCDONALD, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: TURNING THE AMERICAN DREAM INTO A
NIGHTMARE (Bloomsbury Acad. 2012); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE
MAC, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET VIII (2010).
8. See e.g., William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: Housing that Working and
Poor People Can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
394–96, 408–14 (2007); Edward P. Stringham & Nicholas A. Snow, The Broken Trailer
Fallacy: The Disaster of Post-Katrina Housing Policies, 36-SUM ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS
8, 8 (2011).
9. ANNE B. SHLAY, Low-Income Homeownership: American Dream or Delusion?, in
43 URBAN STUDIES, 511, 512 (Routledge 2006).
10. MICHAEL COLLINS, MILLENNIAL HOUSING COMM’N, PURSUING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 3, 5 (Jan. 2002),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/papers/collins.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FYN-5YYM].
11. See Shlay, supra note 9, at 513 (citing E. S. Belsky & M. Duda, Asset appreciation,
timing of purchases, and sales, and returns to low-income homeownership, in LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 208–38 (N.P. Retsinas & E.S.
Belsky eds., Brookings Inst. 2002).
12. See Michal Grinstein-Weiss & Clinton Key, Homeownership, the Great Recession,
and Wealth: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finance, in 25 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE
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of good health, and the building of a secure social network.13 And Ameri-
cans have certainly taken this information to heart. In the second quarter
of 2015 alone, nearly 64% of all Americans owned their home, with such
purchases representing their largest asset and most significant source of
personal wealth.14 Indeed, society often cites the proverb of a man and
his castle to harken to mind a sense of dignity, autonomy, and strength.15
However, in the decades leading up to 2008, a system of financial greed
and poor policy-making did great harm to homeownership in America.16
The low-to-no underwriting standards that led to the rise of subprime
loans, combined with the sudden drop in the value of properties when the
housing bubble burst, resulted in massive defaults and a foreclosure crisis
that rocked the housing market.17 Moreover, with the advent of securi-
tization, these toxic assets came to infect the much larger economy and
resulted in massive layoffs, the stock market plummeting, and the
destabilization of household financial security across the United States.18
As a result, “American households saw the value of residential real estate
fall by over $4 trillion in 2007 and 2008, in addition to a decline in the
total value of US stocks of approximately $8 trillion in 2008 alone.”19 The




14. Homeownership Rates by Region, U.S. CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/housing/
hvs/files/qtr215/hown215.png [https://perma.cc/L3E8-6XTV] (last visited Sept. 4, 2015);
Zhu Xiao Di, Eric Belsky & Xiaodong Liu, Do Homeowners Achieve More Household
Wealth in the Long Run?, 16 J. OF HOUSING ECON. 274–90 (2007).
15. Christopher Hitchens, A Man’s Home Is His Constitutional Castle, SLATE (July 27,
2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2009/07/
a_mans_home_is_his_constitutional_castle.html [https://perma.cc/VS87-8TGZ]; 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Lewis ed., 1922), Lonang Inst., http://lonang.com/library/
reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/bla-416/ [https://perma.cc/66RD-8TFE]
(“[a]nd the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with
impunity . . .”).
16. Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime
Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 500 (2013); Christo-
pher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure, 83 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1155, 1163–66 (2015).
17. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2009); Gregg H. Mosson, Robosigning Fore-
closures: How it Violates Law, Must be Stopped, and Why Mortgage Law Reform is Needed
to Ensure the Certainty and Values of Real Property, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 34–44 & n.36
(2012); Tami Luhby, Robo-signing: Just the Start of Bigger Problems, CNN MONEY.COM
(Oct. 22, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/22/real_estate/foreclosure_paper
work_problems/ [https://perma.cc/QNE5-9SVU]; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2188–90 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson,
Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2010).
18. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1163–66 (discussing mortgage loan securitization and
the dissemination of collateral-based mortgage securities throughout the economy, such as
to pension funds as well as investment banks and related financial institutions).
19. ANAT BRACHA & JULIAN C. JAMISON, SHIFTING CONFIDENCE IN HOME OWNER-
SHIP: THE GREAT RECESSION, FED. RES. BANK OF BOSTON 2 (2011), http://www.bostonfed
.org/economic/conf/LTE2011/papers/bracha_jamison.pdf [https://perma.cc/7END-U48Z].
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ownership rates dropped for African Americans and Hispanics.20
In response, Congress passed a series of acts to bring order and balance
to the housing market and the related financial system by reforming the
ways in which home loans are originated and administered.21 The most
significant of these measures was the Dodd-Frank Act and the related
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that it created, both of which are
geared toward creating better stability in the residential mortgage mar-
ket, in part, by mandating and enforcing robust underwriting by lend-
ers.22 A number of advocates and commentators have noted that these
measures might result in a further tightening of credit, thereby shutting
out many Americans from the dream of homeownership.23 While it is still
20. Recession Widens Racial Homeownership Gap, INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUD-
IES, U. CAL. BERKELEY (Sept. 15, 2011), http://brr.berkeley.edu/2011/09/recession-widens-
racial-homeownership-gap/ [https://perma.cc/7WNP-6KMB].
21. Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Announces 2013 Regulatory Agenda, 66 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 418, 404 (2012); STEVE FORRY, The CFPB in review: a healthy dose of enforce-
ment and a dash of setting boundaries, in BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. (Oct.
2013), http://bi.galegroup.com.proxy.libraries.smu.edu/global/article/GALE%7CA347
431997/0705d0aa0018ec07b77f88e67c5483d8?u=txshracd2548 [https://perma.cc/X62F-AQ
AM]; Jean Eaglesham, Warning Shot On Financial Protection, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703507804576130370862263258 [https://per
ma.cc/QUM6-M848].
22. Adam J. Levitin, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Dodd-Frank Act
and Housing Finance: Can it Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 155, 157–58 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951,
953–54 (2011).
23. Jonathan Weisman & Eric Lipton, In New Congress, Wall St. Pushes to Undermine
Dodd-Frank Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/busi-
ness/economy/in-new-congress-wall-st-pushes-to-undermine-dodd-frank-reform.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/G5UD-G3JE] (“As of Nov. 16, Wall Street banks and other financial in-
terests had spent $1.2 billion on campaign contributions and lobbying combined, a total
that was on track to beat spending in 2010, when Dodd-Frank was being considered in
Congress, according to Americans for Financial Reform.”); Blaine Luetkemeyer, Opposing
view: CFPB is hurting customers, not helping, USA TODAY (October 7, 2012), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2012/10/07/cfpb-credit-obama-consumers/1618493/ [https://per
ma.cc/NDZ6-XN2S]; CUNA to Congress: CFPB hurting consumers, structural changes nec-
essary, CREDIT UNION INSIGHT (July 15, 2015), https://www.cuinsight.com/press-release/
cuna-to-congress-cfpb-hurting-consumers-structural-changes-necessary [https://perma.cc/
N9PM-BKHH]; Sean Hackbarth, Why CFPB’s Complaint Database is a Bad Idea, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM. (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/why-cfpb-
s-complaint-database-bad-idea [https://perma.cc/DWP8-J74T]; Opaque Obama And His
Rogue Credit Agency, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (April 2, 2014), http://www.investors.com/
politics/editorials/rogue-cfpb-bars-republican-lawmaker-duffy-from-secret-meeting/ [https:/
/perma.cc/R94U-V6QM]; Jack Milligan, What is Good, and Bad, About the CFPB,
BANKDIRECTOR.COM (April 20, 2012), http://www.bankdirector.com/magazine/archives/
2nd-quarter-2012/what-is-good-and-bad-about-the-cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/2539-LGB2]
(“My concern is that banks will end up being subjected to a level of scrutiny—and interfer-
ence—by an activist CFPB that is disproportionate to their shortcomings on consumer
issues. It’s not that every bank is perfect, but this industry’s record for consumer fairness is
better than most. Will more intense scrutiny on product design, marketing and distribution
drive up the industry’s costs without yielding a concomitant gain to consumers? Will
tougher regulation on consumer compliance have a chilling effect on innovation?”); Ed-
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too early to tell how true this prediction may be, these financial reforms,
by their very nature, are meant to lead to a class of more creditworthy,
solvent, and reliably non-defaulting borrowers—”super borrowers”—
thereby warding off (so the argument goes) a future housing crisis. In
fact, the latest data shows that lenders are dutifully conforming to these
underwriting limitations in almost all new loan originations.24
From this data, one can conclude that borrowers for whom home loan
credit is now being advanced are more likely than in the past to meet
their financial obligations over the life of the loan.25 This is due to the fact
that these borrowers must meet not only the generalized “ability to re-
pay” requirements that Dodd-Frank imposes upon all mortgage lend-
ers,26 but data suggests that due to risk aversion lenders are opting to
almost exclusively make loans that conform to the heightened standards
of the “qualified mortgage” rubric in order to make use of safe harbor
protections.27
But for all of the many protections and benefits that U.S. law and pol-
icy provide homeowners, one area that is decidedly anti-homeowner is
the modern residential mortgage contract. Lenders have long imposed
one-sided, burdensome, and often harsh terms on their borrowers
through the mortgage contract in order to mitigate their risk of loss in the
event of a default.28 These terms provide everything from control over
payments the owner is obligated to make to third parties in connection
with the property, to the outright usurpation of possession and control of
the property in certain instances.29
But while these provisions might have been in some sense justified at a
time when credit was being given to anyone who asked for it, the world of
financial underwriting has greatly changed since 2010. Since lenders are
24. Commentary, U.S. Residential Mortgage Servicing Mid-Year Review and 2015 Out-
look, DBRS.COM 1, 3 (2015), http://www.dbrs.com/industries/bucket/id/10045/name/com-
mentaries/page/3 [https://perma.cc/ZS6V] (follow “U.S. Residential Mortgage Servicing
Mid-Year Review and 2015 Outlook” hyperlink) [hereinafter DBRS Mortgage Report].
25. See id. at 8 (discussing the low-risk attributes that lenders are requiring for borrow-
ers who fail to meet the stringent requirements to be eligible for the “qualified mortgage”
loan).
26. Elizabeth L. McKeen, Trevor Lain & Dixie Noonan, Mortgage Underwriting: The
Qualified Mortgage and Ability to Repay Rules, 129 BANKING L.J. 826, 826 (2012) (discuss-
ing the factors that mortgage originators must use in analyzing a borrower’s loan applica-
tion, as well as the safe harbor that deems a borrower to be in good faith if the loan and the
borrower have certain low-risk terms and attributes).
27. See DBRS Mortgage Report, supra note 24, at 9 (“DBRS expects that most lenders
who are still recovering from the massive fines they had to pay for making subprime loans
will not be originating anything but QM loans in 2015 unless it is in an effort to accommo-
date a customer with significant liquid assets. As a result, DBRS expects the availability of
credit to continue to be constrained in 2015 for borrowers with blemished credit and a
limited amount of cash reserves.”).
28. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1180–85; see also Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey,
Risk Allocation in Homeownership: Revisiting the Role of Mortgage Contract Terms, in
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SHARED RISK 142–60 (Jacob Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds.,
2012).
29. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1180–84 (describing the terms of the standard resi-
dential mortgage promulgated by the GSEs).
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now disincentivized from making loans to “risky” borrowers—with the
latest reports showing that lenders are choosing to advance credit only to
the most creditworthy of individuals30—the overreaching provisions that
have become such a hallmark of mortgage contracts in the United States
are, in many cases, no longer needed and should be greatly curtailed, with
some being completely removed.31 Such provisions include, among
others, the mandatory escrow requirements for various reoccurring ex-
penses such as property taxes and insurance; the lender’s unilateral right
to enter the premises for inspections and to conduct maintenance and
repairs; and the broad authorizations that borrowers grant to lenders in
the event of any form of default, all prior to foreclosure.32 Thus, the rise
of the new super borrower greatly alleviates the need to maintain many
aspects of the standardized residential mortgage contract as we know it
today, and, instead, provides an opportunity to align mortgage contracts
with broader policy choices regarding homeownership.
This Article argues that if would-be homeowners must now undergo
such stringent credit scrutiny and pass through such an arduous gauntlet
of underwriting, the legal relationship between the borrower and the
lender should—like so many other areas of the law that focus on the pro-
motion and integrity of homeownership—accord the property owner
more autonomy and dignity in his home. Part I puts this notion in context
by discussing the rise and the importance of the standardized residential
mortgage contract.33 Part II then focuses on the modern mortgagor-mort-
gagee relationship through the lens of the development of the standard
residential mortgage contract by discussing housing finance—both the
public and private side of these transactions—and continues by providing
an overview of the financial crisis of 2008 and the legal and regulatory
response that followed it.34 This part also explains the new strict under-
writing requirements brought about by the Dodd-Frank Act under the
creation and supervision of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.35
Part III then places the legal juxtaposition between the rights of home-
owners and mortgage lenders in context by arguing for the modification
or elimination of certain clauses found in standard residential mortgage
contracts by emphasizing the ways in which they nearly eviscerate the
dignity society affords homeownership, how the law attaches to home-
ownership, and how those laws attempt to broadly impinge upon or abro-
gate the rights of the owner.36 Part III concludes by recommending
changes to three provisions in the mortgage contract that either provide
the most opportunities for abuse or diminish the autonomy of the
30. See DBRS Mortgage Report, supra note 24, at 8.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part I.
34. See infra Part II.
35. See id.
36. See infra Part III.
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owner.37 In conclusion, by making such reforms, the mortgage contract
will come to better reflect our broader policy choices about homeowner-
ship, as well as uphold the status of the borrower as the owner of his
home—his castle.
I. THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE CONTRACT
The uniform residential mortgage contract is the cornerstone of Ameri-
can housing finance.38 Indeed, widespread homeownership throughout
this country would hardly be possible without it.39 This all-important in-
strument helps facilitate the flow of housing credit across the country and
provides access to the resources necessary for many Americans to own
their homes.40
A. FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FHA
While the government has always had a hand in housing, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), an agency within the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has played perhaps the
most significant role—and this is certainly true when it comes to the uni-
form residential mortgage contract.41 The FHA can be best conceptual-
ized as “a specialized insurance company that guarantees the payment of
mortgages made by private lenders (banks and other mortgage lenders)
who provide loans to developers and homebuyers.”42 The FHA was
formed in 1934 shortly after the Great Depression when mortgage loans
were not easy to come by.43 Loan-to-value ratios around 50-60% and
large balloon payments were a hallmark of many mortgage loans at the
time.44 The FHA’s mission, however, was to bring reform and fresh air to
the housing finance structure in America.45 In meeting this goal, it helped
usher in mortgage loans that had longer repayment terms and required a
very low down payment.46 But for purposes of this Article, the most im-
portant thing the FHA did was lower the credit risk to private lenders by
providing insurance on the mortgage loans originated with borrower-
favorable terms.47 A private lender could advance credit without the
need to be overly concerned that the borrower might default, and there-
37. See id.
38. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instru-
ments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1078–80 (2007).
39. See id. at 1078.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 1081.
42. See David J. Reiss, Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Hous-
ing Administration and the Low Down Payment Loan, BROOK. L.S. Legal Studies Paper




44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 17.
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fore cause the bank a loss.48 Instead, the FHA would issue a mortgage
insurance policy that would protect the private lender from bearing the
economic brunt of the default.49
Use of FHA loans were very popular for most borrowers.50 Taking out
such a loan with a private lender permitted the borrower to put down a
smaller down payment than would otherwise be required under the
lender’s conventional underwriting standards; weak or low credit scores
did not serve as a disqualifier, insubstantial employment or income levels
were allowable, and a higher debt to value ratio was sanctioned with an
FHA loan.51
Importantly, however, the FHA heralded the arrival of the secondary
mortgage market.52 Since an FHA-backed mortgage loan carried with it a
government guarantee, lenders who originated mortgages could easily
sell the loans to other lenders and financial institutions for an immediate
return.53 To provide a ready group of buyers of such loans (and thereby
increase bank liquidity for purposes of making additional mortgage
loans), over time the government created special entities called Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae to purchase these loans and provide
more liquidity to the mortgage market—thus expanding credit further.54
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (chartered in 1930 and 1970, respec-
tively)—the so-called government-sponsored entities (GSEs)—are the
most powerful of the three entities when it comes to housing economics.55
These companies, created by Congress, are mandated to expand the
availability of mortgage credit in the U.S., specifically by aiming to ser-
vice certain income groups, while at the same time operating like a pri-
vate company (in other words, with an aim toward profits and increasing
shareholder value).56 Through their mortgage purchasing and securitiza-
tion activities over the years they have become the largest and most sub-
stantial generator of homebuyer credit in the U.S.57
B. THE MOVE TOWARD STANDARDIZATION
As Forrester and Carrozzo note in their work on the standard residen-
tial mortgage, uniformity of documents in the housing finance world was
48. See Reiss, supra note 42, at 17.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 18.
51. See id. at 22–23.
52. See id. at 17.
53. See id. at 18.
54. See Reiss, supra note 42, at 17–18.
55. See id. at 17 (“To advance [mortgage credit] even further, the federal government
created Fannie Mae in 1938 to create a secondary market for FHA mortgages. Fannie Mae
spun off Ginnie Mae in 1968 to securitize FHA mortgages while Fannie securitized mort-
gages that were not insured by the federal government.”).
56. David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Fi-
nance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907, 908–10 (2010) [herein-
after FHA].
57. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instru-
ment: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2007).
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quite unheard of prior to 1970.58 Despite attempts by large financial insti-
tutions operating in various states, as well as professional and trade
groups, to create some uniformity, the various nuances of state property
law often served as a significant roadblock.59 Indeed, the lack of uniform-
ity made the process of pooling and securitizing mortgage loans very
difficult.60
Although not on the same scale as the Great Depression, an inflation-
ary period in the late 1960s brought about a mortgage credit crisis as in-
vestors, due to low interest rates, sought higher yields in non-mortgage-
related investments.61 This resulted in a credit problem as banks suddenly
lacked the funds necessary to continue making new home loans—regard-
less of the possibility of a government-backed guarantee through the
FHA.62 As a result, in 1970 Congress passed the Emergency Home Fi-
nance Act, which was aimed at making the secondary mortgage market
more robust and expansive.63 In the wake of this legislation, the GSEs
stated that the first task they would undertake as a result of the new law
was to create a “standard mortgage form.”64 However, the process was
not easy.65 A large group of lawyers and housing advocates from various
sectors came together to begin drafting the all-important document, but
the voices often clashed as various interests often failed to align.66 Lend-
ers’ counsel wanted robust covenants and warranties imposed upon the
borrower, while customer advocacy groups fought back for more protec-
tions for homeowners.67 After much testimony, public hearings, and de-
58. See id.; see also Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emer-
gency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 766 (2005) (“Until as late as the 1960s, mortgage lending
occurred on a predominantly local scale; neighborhood banks and savings and loans lent
homebuyers money that was financed by the savings of people in the community where the
mortgage property was located. Lenders held these loans in their portfolios until maturity
or the sale of the property.”).
59. See Forrester, supra note 57, at 1083; Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardiza-
tion: History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397, 398 (1972).
60. See Forrester, supra note 57, at 1083; Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 777 (quoting the
testimony of Federal Reserve Board Governor Maisel that the creation of a secondary
mortgage market would “hasten efforts to standardize the conventional residential mort-
gage—a desirable step in itself” due to the fact that at the time most mortgage contracts
“[l]ack[ed] the degree of homogeneity required for active trading in the secondary mar-
ket.” (alteration in original)).
61. Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 767–68.
62. See id.
63. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450; see also
Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 767–68.
64. Forrester, supra note 57, at 1083 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed that their
‘first order of business must be the development of a standard mortgage form.’”).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1084 (“These drafts contained many pro-lender provisions that were cus-
tomarily contained in most mortgages. To the extent they limited the lender’s rights or
remedies or gave the borrower rights, lenders objected. However, the more strenuous ob-
jections came from consumer groups.”).
67. Id. (“In response to demands for public hearings from Senator Proxmire and
Ralph Nader, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held a public meeting about the forms on April
5-6, 1971. Although not technically a hearing, Congressman Albert Rains chaired the
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bate, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac developed a single form, arguably
bent toward the borrower while still mindful of the creditor, and they
jointly published the finished product.68 As Professor Forrester notes, the
form has been changed some over the years, but it remains largely the
same as its 1970s iteration.69
C. THE RESULT OF STANDARDIZATION
Once the uniform mortgage contract was completed, its use spread
quickly.70 In essence, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the biggest play-
ers in the secondary mortgage market and, because of this, they set the
rules of the game.71 Both announced that they would only accept home
loans that were secured by mortgages that appeared in their particular
form.72 Thus, all those originating banks and financial entities that wished
to increase their immediate liquidity by selling their mortgage loans to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were forced to immediately switch over to
using the uniform contract.73 In fact, even financial institutions that
originated home loans, but did not necessarily contemplate selling them
on the secondary market, nevertheless issued the loans using the uniform
mortgage.74 The ubiquity of the uniform instrument throughout the hous-
ing finance market is a testament to the power that the GSEs and the
secondary market play in mortgage lending nation-wide.
Importantly, most of the early work of the consumer groups who sat at
the table and advocated on behalf of homeowners during those heated
hearings and meetings in 1970 remains in place.75 Indeed, the homeown-
ers of today still enjoy the good work of these individuals each time they
take out a home loan and sign the accompanying mortgage.76 Some of the
major pro-consumer provisions won from those battles are worthy of
note. These include the availability of the fixed-term interest rate (a very
important financial term for borrowers who might otherwise be worried
about the volatility that can come along with an adjustable rate mort-
gage),77 and the ability to repay the mortgage loan prior to the end of the
term (and thereby avoid what can be significant future interest payments)
meeting, and forty witnesses testified, including Nader. Consumer advocates criticized nu-
merous provisions of the draft forms. Nader testified that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
had ‘a golden opportunity to develop perhaps the first fair and balanced standardized
form.’”).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1085.




74. See Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 802–03.
75. Forrester, supra note 57, at 1084–85.
76. See id. at 1087 (“Because of their widespread use and their exceptionally fair
terms, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform instruments provide a significant benefit to
homeowners.”).
77. See id. at 1088 (“The primary benefit in financial terms offered by the GSEs is the
availability of the long term fixed-rate loan.”).
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without the need to pay a penalty or fee.78 Further, borrowers benefit
from mandatory default notice periods (30-days at a minimum) and limi-
tations on late fees and penalties.79
Professor Forrester points out that just as significant as the terms in-
cluded in the uniform mortgage contract are those that are absent from
it.80 Provisions that are frequently seen in “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts
of adhesion are fairly absent from the residential mortgage.81 These in-
clude waivers of a right to a trial by jury, arbitration clauses, and waivers
of notice and other rights of the borrower.82 Professor Forrester also
notes that, although residential mortgage transactions are similar to other
types of consumer transactions in that the consumer has no opportunity
(or at least not a meaningful opportunity) to negotiate the terms of the
deal, this unfavorable situation is mitigated by the fact that the creditor
does not have the ability to unilaterally set the terms of the deal to skew
in its favor because all lenders are forced to use a document that is pre-
ordained and that has already been greatly influenced by consumer
advocates.83
Standardization of the mortgage contract has played a tremendous role
in the housing finance market in the United States. It has allowed for a
system of reliable securitization of mortgage loans that, in turn, increase
the liquidity of financial institutions and thereby augments their ability to
provide more credit and increase homeownership. Similarly, it has been
argued that standardization has resulted in mortgage contracts that are
fairer to consumer debtors when compared with the “terms of commer-
cial mortgage loan documents, subprime mortgage loan documents, and
other types of consumer documents.”84
II. HOUSING FINANCE, DODD-FRANK, AND
REFORM REVISITED
Standardization and the secondary mortgage market revolutionized the
way mortgage credit was created and made available in the U.S.85 It has
allowed individuals to become homeowners and has increased household
wealth for many Americans.86 Indeed, “the availability of affordable
mortgage money and assembly-line lending practices . . . propel an un-
precedented deluge of conveyances and refinances.”87
78. Id. at 1089–90 (pointing out the benefits to homeowners in terms of refinancing
their loans when interest rates dip).
79. See id. at 1090–91 (noting that there are some non-uniformities with this provision
from state-to-state due to varying rights of the lender in each jurisdiction).
80. See id. at 1093–94.
81. See Forrester, supra note 57, at 1095 (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1177 (1983)).
82. See id. at 1093–94.
83. Id. at 1095–96.
84. See id. at 1109.
85. Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 802–03.
86. See Grinstein-Weiss, supra note 12, at 4–5; see also Shlay, supra note 9, at 520.
87. See Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 802–03.
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For the most part, mortgage lending and the wide availability of credit
continued throughout the second half of the 20th century. However, fi-
nancial free-wheeling and artificially rising home prices eventually caught
up with mortgage credit markets, and when the housing market and
larger economy crashed in 2007 and 2008, Congress was forced to re-
spond.88 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 significantly overhauled many of the ways in which home
loans are made89 but, as discussed in the following section, it did very
little to change the ways in which lenders dictate the relationship with
their borrowers once credit is advanced through the lens of the mortgage
contract.
A. MORTGAGE FINANCE IN THE U.S.
Indisputably, the acquisition of a home by most Americans comes from
purchase-money borrowing from a lender, and the centerpiece of that re-
lationship—between the borrower/homeowner and the lender—is the
residential mortgage contract. As noted above, the provisions found in
the standard residential mortgage contract were developed in the late
1960s during the hearings conducted in connection with the creation of
the secondary mortgage market. These hearings had particular motiva-
tions, most of which dealt with liquidity and access to mortgage across the
country
1. Housing Policies and Federally-Backed Mortgages
To understand the significance of the terms in contemporary mortgage
contracts and how they fit (or do not) into today’s new regulatory land-
scape, it is necessary to understand the progression of mortgage credit all
the way to the recent Great Recession.
While reams of paper have been dedicated to the causes of the 2008
crash, a summary of the major causes of the crisis are helpful.90 Many
housing experts have argued, quite persuasively, that federal housing and
financial regulatory policy played at least some role in the crisis. Certainly
the beginnings of homeownership and the expansion of mortgage credit
can be found in the creation of the FHA, the GSEs, and then eventually
88. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE, THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Penguin Group 2010); Damian Paletta & Aaron
Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2010), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958 [https://perma.cc/
Y3NX-VZ4D]; THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES
OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNN3-5B8X] [hereinafter Commis-
sion Report].
89. Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J.
213, 264–68 (2013); Jann Swanson, House Holds Another Hearing on Impact of Dodd-
Frank Mortgage Requirements, MORTG. DAILY NEWS (July 11, 2012), http://www.mort-
gagenewsdaily.com/07112012_dodd_frank_cfrb.asp [ https://perma.cc/JT7T-AZ3T].
90. This Article does not in any way attempt to treat the issue comprehensively.
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the secondary market for conventional mortgages, as noted above.91
However, in the 1990s the federal government greatly loosened lending
standards, and in 1995 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) set a national homeownership goal of 70%.92 In order
to meet this goal, as required by law, the GSEs relaxed their lending stan-
dards and started issuing loans with ever-increasing loan-to-value ratios.93
When the GSEs reached the outer limits of their underwriting capabili-
ties—unable to relax their standards any further—they began to purchase
subprime securitized mortgage loans on the secondary market from pri-
vate-label lenders (who did little to no meaningful underwriting) in order
to further HUD’s ambitious homeownership goals.94 And indeed, by all
accounts the GSEs have been integral in oiling the wheels of the housing
market.95 Through their own loan originations and through the mortgage
purchases on the secondary market, Fannie and Freddie’s total assets in-
creased from $78 billion in 1980 to $3.6 trillion in 2003.96 In fact, by 2010,
these two entities “owned or guaranteed approximately half of all out-
standing mortgages in the United States.”97 However, weak underwriting
and federal policy-making trumped sound economic principles, eventu-
ally leading to wide, free-wheeling access to housing credit, and greatly
contributing to the ultimate crash.98
2. Cheap Money, Securitization, and Conventional Mortgage Lending
It would be wrong to say that federal housing policy was the only con-
tributor to the financial crash. If the government provided the car, greed,
and predatory lending, risky financial engineering by private enterprise
would serve as its driver. Nevertheless, one other government entity is
worth mentioning in connection with the role that government policy
played in the crisis. Prior to 2008, the Federal Reserve kept market inter-
est rates incredibly low by way of its control over the federal funds rate.99
This, in turn, provided greater access to mortgage credit, which many
Americans viewed as a good way to obtain cheap money to invest in resi-
91. See supra Part I.B-C.
92. See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: How Government Housing Policy Failed Home-
owners and Taxpayers and Led to the Housing Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
113th Cong. 9–10, 49–50 (2013) (statement of John Ligon, Policy Analyst in the Center for
Data Analysis at the Heritage Foundation).
93. See id. at 50.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 49.
97. Id.
98. See FHA, supra note 56, at 51 (describing how homeownership goals drove
underwriting).
99. See Commission Report, supra note 88, at 84 (“To stimulate borrowing and spend-
ing, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee lowered short-term interest rates ag-
gressively.”) They would lower the interest rate 11 times throughout 2001, down to a mere
1.75%. The interest rate had not been that low in over 40 years.
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dential real estate.100 And at least at the time, it was indeed a good in-
vestment.101 During the early 2000s, home prices rose annually at a rate
between 5.2% and 11.5%—staggering by anyone’s account.102 Awash
with cheap credit and confident in their home’s value, the average con-
sumer jumped right in and borrowed even more.103 National mortgage
debt between 2001 and 2007 doubled, and the vast majority of this debt
was through mortgage lending, much to the rejoicing of the banks.104
Moreover, it was not merely new loans that brought about these mort-
gage transactions; the refinancing of existing mortgage debt was huge.105
“In 2003 alone, lenders refinanced over $15 million worth of mortgages,
which amounted to more than one in four.”106 Borrowers not only refi-
nanced to take advantage of cheaper interest rates, but did so in an effort
to cash out the ever-rising equity in their homes.107 By one account, dur-
ing this period homeowners in the U.S. cashed out $430 billion in home
equity loans.108 A person’s home equity became a sort of piggy-bank, the
funds from which could be used to pay for a number of expenses and
luxuries.
Similarly, private lenders took advantage of the new influx of borrow-
ers by making so-called “subprime” loans.109 These loans were made to
individuals who would never be able to qualify for otherwise carefully
underwritten prime loans.110 Subprime loans were expensive to borrow-
ers—often comprising high fees and charges.111 Most borrowers did not,
however, understand how harmful these types of credit facilities could be
at the time.112 Moreover, these borrowers often lacked the knowledge or
resources necessary to challenge the lender.113 While there were various
100. See id. at 83 (“Lower interest rates and broader access to credit were available for
other types of borrowing, too, such as credit cards and auto loans.”).
101. Id. at 83–85.
102. See id. at 83, 85 (“In California, a house bought for $200,000 in 1995 was worth
$454,428 nine years later.”).
103. See id. at 83.
104. See id. at 83–84.
105. Commission Report, supra note 88, at 83–84.
106. See id. at 86.
107. See id. at 86–87.
108. See id. at 87.
109. Id. at 88.
110. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1159–60; see also Singer, supra note 16, at 507; Chris-
topher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2010); Gerald Korngold, Legal and
Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 727, 728–29 (2009); ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 318, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORT-
GAGE CREDIT 5 (2008).
111. See Commission Report, supra note 88, at 90.
112. See id. (“A study by two Federal Reserve economists estimated at least 38% of
borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages did not understand how much their interest rates
could reset at one time, and more than half underestimated how high their rates could
reach over the years.”).
113. See id. (One professor of economics at Dartmouth College stated: “Comparing
terms of financial contracts and shopping around before making financial decisions are not
at all common among the population.”).
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rules regarding mortgage lending throughout the 1980s, many of these
were rolled back or eliminated in the 1990s under the auspices of provid-
ing more credit to traditionally underrepresented groups.114 Moreover,
financial regulators had little appetite to police the types of loans lenders
made and to what type of borrowers credit was advanced.115 For instance,
when confronted with the possibility of creating rules to govern the un-
derwriting of mortgage loans to new borrowers, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency stated “[d]ecisions concerning the forms and terms
of national bank lending are properly the responsibility of each bank’s
directorate and management” and not a space to be occupied by the
government.116
The final piece of the mortgage crisis was securitization.117 Inextricably
connected to the creation of the secondary mortgage market back in the
1970s,118 this “process involved a labyrinthine scheme of buying, selling,
swapping, and insuring . . . legal instruments that comprised a host of
mortgage/credit rights through various nominees of the true parties.”119
This system started with the financial institution—called the mortgage
originator—that made the upfront loan to the borrower.120 The origina-
tor would technically engage in an underwriting analysis of the borrower
by looking at his credit history, employment status, and current obliga-
tions, among other things, and determine “whether the prospective
homebuyer had the ability to repay the loan.”121 “It was at this stage of
the transaction that subprime borrowers—those who, by all the accounts,
could not repay [their] loan—were nevertheless approved for credit.”122
In turn, the borrower would sign a note and a mortgage contract—by
now fairly uniform across the country—on the real property to secure
it.123
Almost immediately after the advance, the originator would sell the
114. See John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 178–79 (2011) (“Prior
to 1982, there were good, old-fashioned rules (not standards) imposed by statute on mort-
gage originators, such as the hard cap of a ninety percent ‘loan-to-value’ (‘LTV’) ratio for
improved real estate loans issued by national banks and maximum thirty-year full amorti-
zation terms for residential mortgages. Then the headiness of 1980s deregulation brought
such developments as the Garn-St. Germain Act (and the related Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act), which boldly dispatched such backward-thinking, heavy-govern-
ment suffocation of consumer credit. Recall that the Community Reinvestment Act
(‘CRA’) was passed in 1977, and so such deregulatory moves were not only consonant with
the spirit of the 1980s but could also be couched in the credit-opening rhetoric of bringing
homeownership to historically underserved communities under the civil-rights era policies
of the CRA. With traditional mortgage lenders liberated from their ‘stodgy’ underwriting
standards, housing would come to everyone at last!”).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 179 (citing Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,699
(Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34)).
117. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 116–65.
118. See Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 800–01.
119. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1163.
120. Id. at 1163–64.
121. Id. at 1164.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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loan package to a third-party called an arranger.124 These arrangers
would purchase a host of mortgage loans from various originators and,
through an aggregation process, create a form of security that could then
be bought, sold, or traded to third party investors, typically through the
investor purchasing a nominal interest in a special purpose vehicle (like a
trust) that would have ownership of the pooled mortgage loans.125 These
were called mortgage-backed securities. As noted above, the biggest pur-
chasers of these mortgage-backed securities were the GSEs—Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.126 Indeed, as noted above, they were created for the
sole purpose of facilitating a secondary mortgage market.127 Shortly after
the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 was passed, securitization
took hold.128 The first occurred at the end of September 1977 when “the
first private offering of interests in a pool of conventional mortgages” was
made.129 The investment pool consisted of mortgage loans made between
1972 and 1977, representing about 2,818 promissory notes with an interest
rate of 8.75% with 30-year payment terms and a loan-to-value ratio of
80%.130 “The mortgage industry embraced the movement; securitization
of home mortgage loans exploded in the 1980s.”131 Meanwhile, at the
core of this system remained the standardized residential mortgage—the
link between the borrower, the lender, and the system that oiled the
wheels of mortgage credit nation-wide.132
It is important to bear in mind that the only thing that changes from
the borrower’s point of view as a result of securitization is that she is now
required to make her mortgage payments to a nominee of the investors—
the mortgage servicer—rather than to the original lender.133 The servicer
is in charge of not only collecting the required monthly payments but also
dealing directly with the borrower in the event any issues arose.134
“[T]he ability of mortgage lenders to off-load their risk to third parties
almost immediately upon making the risky loan removed a major protec-
tion for borrowers.”135 The lender had no “skin in the game,” and there-
fore was not made to bear the risks associated with making the loan, since
by the time a default might occur the economic loss would fall upon an-
other party.136
Importantly, those who invested in these mortgage pools were signifi-
cant players in the American economy—which made the eventual crash
124. Id.
125. Odinet, supra note 16, at 1164.
126. See FHA, supra note 56, at 17–18.
127. See id. at 3, 17–18.
128. See Carrozo, supra note 58, at 800–01.
129. See id. at 800.
130. Id. at 800–01.
131. Id. at 801.
132. See id. at 797–99.
133. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1164.
134. Id. at 1164–65.
135. Id. at 1164.
136. See id. at 1162, 1165.
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all the more disastrous.137 Many large institutional investors such as pen-
sion systems, hedge funds, and large portfolio investors had moved away
from treasury bonds and similar instruments due to the low yield rate on
those investments (driven in large part by the Federal Reserve’s suppres-
sion of interest rates discussed above).138 Instead, they shifted over to
purchasing alternative assets, like securitized mortgage loans.139 These
collateral-backed mortgage securities proved to be a favorite and they
spread like wildfire.140 Through this process, mortgage-backed securi-
ties—consisting of subprime loans obtained by borrowers through little to
no underwriting and secured by soon to be worthless collateral—as well
as their derivatives (like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and syn-
thetic CDOs) came to infect almost all sectors of the American financial
economy.141 And yet, at the core of the crisis stood the standard residen-
tial mortgage contract—unchanged, still allegedly consumer-oriented,
and little noticed.
B. DODD-FRANK AND MORTGAGE REFORM
The magnitude of the damage caused by the economic crisis of 2008,
which was driven largely by failed housing policies and risky financial
engineering, spurred Congress and the President to action.142 This gov-
ernment response was tremendous in both its breadth and depth.143 Part
of Congress’s actions involved the injection of trillions of dollars in emer-
gency loans and in the purchasing of equity stakes in failing financial in-
stitutions.144 This period of muscular government intervention in private
financial markets was supported in large part by the so-called “too big to
fail” policy.145 This concept stood for the notion that certain financial in-
stitutions, because of their wide reach and integration into the American
economy, would cause so much damage if they were allowed to fail that
expenditures of taxpayer money were justified in keeping them afloat and
attempting to bring them back to financial health.146
However, the largest effort, and the one that is of concern in this arti-
cle, was Congress’s attempt to overhaul the financial regulatory system in
the U.S.147 The centerpiece of this effort was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), passed in
137. See id. at 1166.
138. See Ligon, supra note 92, at 50–52.
139. See id.
140. See Singer, supra note 16, at 501.
141. Id. at 511.
142. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO: Financial Reform].
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 39.
146. See id. at 11, 38.
147. See id. at 1.
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2010.148 The over-riding goal of the legislation was to deal with future
risks to the stability of the American economy, to prevent any future “too
big to fail” bailouts of large financial institutions, and to create new and
strengthen existing protections for consumers and investors, in part, by
creating more transparency and regulation for the more complex and
risky financial products that had caused or contributed to the crisis.149
1. Background and Overview of the CFPB
A key offspring of the Dodd-Frank Act is the newly created Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).150 The CFPB represents a concept,
most prominently proposed by then law professor, now U.S. Senator,
Elizabeth Warren, in 2007 and championed by a host of consumer fi-
nance-focused legal academics.151 Essentially, the bureau is an indepen-
dent agency within the Federal Reserve that focuses on the regulation
and enforcement of consumer protection in the financial sector.152 While
these general duties were previously spread across a variety of disparate
agencies ranging from the Federal Reserve, HUD, the Treasury, the
FDIC and beyond, the Dodd-Frank Act consolidated these functions and
responsibilities, in most cases, into one agency— the CFPB.153
The CFPB has oversight of many areas of the U.S. financial economy,
ranging from securities, credit cards, bank and non-bank monitoring, pay-
day lenders, and student loans.154 While various other agencies, such as
the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and state-
level banking supervisors still play a partial or even primary role in the
148. Dodd-Frank Wall St. Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.); see
also Damian Paletta, U.S. Lawmakers Reach Accord on New Finance Rules, WALL ST. J.
(Jun. 25, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703615104575328020013164
184 [https://perma.cc/NLC4-H3CF]; Reza Dibadj, Dodd-Frank: Toward First Principles?,
15 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 79 (2011); Gary L. Goldberg, Dodd-Frank Act at One Year: An
Overview, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 229, 229 (2011).
149. See GAO: Financial Reform, supra note 142, at 5.
150. Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Announces 2013 Regulatory Agenda, 66 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 418, 404 (2012); Steve Forry, The CFPB in Review: A Healthy Dose of Enforce-
ment and a Dash of Setting Boundaries, 32 NO. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP.
1, 1 (2013), at 1; Jean Eaglesham, Warning Shot On Financial Protection, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
9, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703507804576130370862263258
[https://perma.cc/MBU2-7HYV].
151. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (2007), http://democra-
cyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/4ZMJ-72ZJ]. While cer-
tainly the most prominent, many other academics pushed for the creation of such an
umbrella agency for consumer protection as well. See Vern Countryman, Improvident
Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1 (1975); see also John
A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405,
407 (2007); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002).
152. VIRAL V. ACHARYA & THOMAS F. COOLEY, REGULATING WALL ST.: THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 6 (Viral V. Acharya et
al. eds., 2010).
153. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER FINAN-
CIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2014).
154. See id. at 13, 17.
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regulation of several of these areas, the CFPB shares a great deal of the
power and responsibility when it comes to ensuring a safe and sound U.S.
financial sector.155 For purposes of this article, the CFPB’s authority over
the mortgage finance sector of the economy is particularly significant.156
Unsurprisingly, because of the many fault lines discussed above regarding
housing policy and the financial engineering of the recent past, the first
major project of the CFPB was to create rules to end subprime borrowing
and the complete lack of underwriting that had been so pervasive in the
pre-2008 housing finance sector.157 These changes are significant because
despite the massive ways in which they have altered the mortgage finance
system in the United States, they did little-to-nothing to change the con-
tent of the central document that governs the relationship between the
homeowners and his lender—the mortgage contract.158
2. Assessing the Ability to Repay
The first major way that the CFPB changed the housing finance system
was to impose what had, until now, been merely good practice—meaning-
ful underwriting.159 While lenders had at various times been more or less
muscular in their use of underwriting criteria in issuing mortgage loans,
the CFPB altered the landscape significantly by requiring that underwrit-
ing take place for all new mortgage loans.160 Moreover, stiff penalties and
dire consequences could be brought down upon a lender who failed to
engage in this process.161
Specifically, Section 1411(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act changed the Truth
In Lending Act (TILA) by creating a section 1411 entitled the “Mortgage
Reform and Anti-predatory Lending Act.”162 This section states that:
[N]o creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the credi-
tor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on veri-
fied and documented information that, at the time the loan is
consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the
loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (in-
cluding mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.163
The legislation further specifies that this determination can be made
using a number of different factors.164 For instance, a lender may look to
the borrower’s credit history and current levels of income.165 The lender
also has the flexibility to take into consideration any future income that
155. See id. at 9, 20.
156. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 882 (2013).
157. See id. at 908.
158. See id.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2010).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 1640.
162. Id. § 1639c(a)(1).
163. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 111–94, at 8 (2009).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3) (2010).
165. Id.
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the borrower might reasonably expect to receive in the future.166 The
lender must also analyze the current liabilities and debts of the borrower
that would otherwise compete with the mortgage’s debt servicing require-
ments.167 Employment status, debt-to-income ratios, and access to in-
come after the borrower satisfies all mortgage and non-mortgage related
obligations are also included in the analysis.168 Moreover, lenders cannot
make these determinations based solely from the information provided
by the borrower.169 In most instances, the lender must verify the docu-
mentation based on information provided by reliable third parties.170
And importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that residential mortgage
loans provide for a term that is fully amortizing.171
The CFPB followed up by issuing rules that elaborated on the new abil-
ity to repay requirements found in Dodd-Frank, made effective January
1, 2014, by adding Section 1026.43 to Regulation Z.172 Among other
things, the regulations provide that monthly payments must be calculated
by assuming that the loan will be repaid in equal, monthly installments
during its term.173 It also defines total debt obligations, a phrase used to
determine debt-to-loan ratios, as “the sum of payments on the loan, si-
multaneous loans, mortgage-related obligations, current debt obligations,
alimony, and child support.”174 The regulation also provides that lenders
must maintain loan records evidencing compliance with the ability to re-
pay requirement for three years after each loan is made.175
Failure to comply with the guidelines for these new underwriting re-
quirements can be severe.176 First, a lender who violates the duty to make
a good faith determination as to a borrower’s ability to repay is subject to
the standard damages remedy that already exists under the Truth in
Lending Act, which includes “actual damages, statutory damages (which
are in the nature of punitive damages), and if the consumer prevails, at-
torneys’ fees and court costs.”177 More importantly however, violation of





170. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4).
171. Id.
172. Michael B. Mierzewski et al., CFPB Finalizes Ability-to-Repay and Qualified
Mortgage Rule, 130 BANKING L.J. 611, 611 (2013) (codified as 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2013)).
Regulation Z is the omnibus federal regulation that interprets the provision of the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA). See Press Release, CFPB Lays Out Implementation Plan for New
Mortgage Rules, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-lays-out-implementa-
tion-plan-for-new-mortgage-rules/ [https://perma.cc/CCW2-22WS].
173. Robert K. Olsen & Jessica Nguyen, An Overview of the New Ability-to-Repay and
Qualified Mortgage Rules Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 33 NO. 10 BANKING & FIN. SER-
VICES POL’Y REP. 14, 15–16 (2014); see also Mierzewski et al., supra note 172, at 613.
174. Mierzewski et al., supra note 172, at 614.
175. Id.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2010).
177. See Olsen, supra note 173, at 19.
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to arrest a foreclosure (whether judicial or non-judicial).178 For a lender
facing a mountain of defaulted properties that desperately need to be
processed through foreclosure, a legal defense based on a lack of under-
writing can cause a significant problem. Lastly, if statutory damages are
awarded, these can include amounts equal to the aggregate of all finance
charges and other fees paid by the borrower.179
3. The Qualified Mortgage
For those mortgage lenders concerned with the uncertainty of whether
their particular underwriting method meets the ability to repay require-
ment—a fact that can practically only be discovered once the loan is
made and it is too late—the CFPB provides some relief.180 This relief
comes in the form of a safe harbor that, if met by a mortgage lender,
creates a presumption (in some cases conclusively and in others rebutta-
ble) that the loan meets Dodd-Frank’s underwriting requirements.181 This
safe harbor takes the form of a mortgage loan package that contains cer-
tain terms and complies with heightened underwriting requirements.182 It
is known as the “qualified mortgage.”183
The concept is not entirely unique to Dodd-Frank. Indeed, in 2009, the
Federal Reserve issued a rule imposing a duty to assess a borrower’s abil-
ity to repay certain high-priced mortgage loans, and an accompanying
qualified mortgage safe harbor for those as well.184 But Dodd-Frank,
through the CFPB, took these concepts and ran with them by making
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408–01, 6504 (Jan. 30, 2013).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) (2015) (“Any creditor with respect to any residential mort-
gage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability under this subchapter, may
presume that the loan has met the requirements of [the ability to repay], if the loan is a
qualified mortgage.”); see also Olsen & Nguyen, supra note 173, at 17.
182. Stephen F. J. Ornstein et al., CFPB Ability-to-Repay Rule and Qualified Mortgage
Definition, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 417, 349 (2012).
183. See id. at 391–92 (“Approximately two years ago, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (FRB) proposed a rule amending Regulation Z to implement an
expanded ability-to-repay mortgage loan requirement and define a ‘qualified mortgage’ in
accordance with various Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) amendments to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Responsibility for
this rulemaking with respect to Regulation Z passed to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) on July 21, 2011. On January 10, 2013, the CFPB completed the initial
phase of this rulemaking process by issuing an ability-to-repay final rule that will funda-
mentally reshape the residential mortgage loan market (the 2013 ATR Final Rule). Effec-
tive January 10, 2014, the 2013 ATR Final Rule: (1) institutes a broad ability-to-repay
requirement applicable to virtually the entire residential mortgage market; (2) defines a
new category of ‘qualified mortgage’; and (3) establishes a two-tier safe harbor/rebuttable
presumption legal structure for assessing compliance with the ability-to-repay requirement
for ‘qualified mortgages’ that roughly distinguishes between ‘prime’ and ‘subprime’ mort-
gage loans.”).
184. Summary of the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule and the Concurrent
Proposal, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301
_cfpb_ability-to-repay-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL8W-D5GC].
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them applicable to all mortgage loans, whatever their terms.185
The qualified mortgage loan is any residential mortgage loan that
meets certain low-risk underwriting requirements.186 First, the payments
made by the borrower cannot result in an increase in the principal, and
the loan agreement cannot allow a borrower to defer the payment of the
principal (thereby cutting off the possibility of negative amortizing loans
and loans with varying payment choices).187 Second, all financial informa-
tion relative to the borrower’s income and economic resources must be
well documented and substantiated.188 Third, loans that call for balloon
payments are absolutely prohibited.189 Fourth, loans with fixed interest
rates must be underwritten using a fully amortized payment schedule, and
loans with adjustable interest rates must be underwritten using the maxi-
mum rate allowed under the loan for the first five years of the term, with
a payment schedule that fully amortizes it over the entire term of the
loan.190 Both of these requirements are meant to ensure the borrower is
not hit with a “payment shock” during the duration of the loan.191 Sixth,
the loan must adhere to certain debt to income ratios.192 Seventh, so-
called points and lender fees can be no more than three percent of the
entire loan amount,193 and eighth, the term of the loan cannot be greater
than thirty years, with some exceptions.194
If a mortgage loan meets these requirements, it passes the ability to
repay test and, although provided in more specificity in companion regu-
lations, can even provide an avenue for lenders to avoid the credit reten-
tion provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.195 The aim of the CFPB was to
create, as mortgage law scholar Professor David Reiss notes, “a kind of
‘plain vanilla’ mortgage option that lenders will want to originate because
it poses fewer regulatory and litigation risks.”196
It is important to note that these various regulatory requirements im-
posed on mortgage lenders represent an extreme departure from the
185. See id.
186. See David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified Mort-
gage” Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 722 n.13 (2012).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(i) (2015).
188. See id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(iii).
189. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(ii).
190. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v).
191. See Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 186, at 724.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi).
193. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vii).
194. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(viii) (stating that there are exceptions for certain loans in
high-cost areas).
195. See Reiss, supra note 186, 722–23 (“The ‘Qualified Mortgage’ is one that is privi-
leged by Dodd-Frank in order to incentivize lenders to originate them instead of other
types of mortgages. The ‘Qualified Mortgage’ provides lenders with a safe harbor from
certain provisions of the Truth In Lending Act (‘TILA’) as well as from Dodd-Frank’s
mandatory ‘ability to repay’ underwriting standards. Dodd-Frank leaves the term ‘Quali-
fied Residential Mortgage’ to be defined by federal regulators, but it must be no broader
than a ‘Qualified Mortgage.’ The ‘Qualified Residential Mortgage’ is exempted from the
credit risk retention (‘skin in the game’) provisions that apply to securitizers and origina-
tors of asset-backed securities.”).
196. See id. at 723.
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methods of the past.197 As noted commercial law professor John Pottow
observed, classic contract law in the realm of lenders declares that “ab-
sent special circumstances, a loan does not establish a fiduciary relation-
ship between a commercial bank and its debtor.”198 Moreover, courts
have consistently declined to impose upon lenders a common law duty to
determine whether their borrowers possessed the ability to repay when
advancing credit.199 As one court noted: “[t]he lender has no judicially
imposed duty to ensure [the] ability to repay the loan . . .”200 And the
lack of a duty extends further than that; Professor Pottow notes that tra-
ditionally, “lenders do not even owe borrowers a duty of care to avoid
negligence in the lending process.”201 Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s regu-
lations represent a sea change in the mortgage lending paradigm.
C. THE MARKET RESPONDS: EXPLORING THE DATA
The ability to repay and the qualified mortgage have been both criti-
cized and praised.202 Opponents argue that they represent the worst kind
of paternalism by limiting the freedom and flexibility enjoyed by lenders
in offering a variety of credit products to financial consumers, and by
restricting the options borrowers have when it comes to home buying.203
Moreover, a primary complaint in the wake of these regulations was that
they would result in the tightening of credit and a significant decline in
the possibility of homeownership for many Americans.204
197. See Pottow, supra note 114, at 178–79.
198. Id. at 177 (citing Das v. Bank of America, 186 Cal. App. 4th 727, 740 (2010)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 178.
201. Id.
202. Let’s Pretend Dodd-Frank Works, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2014 12:17 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/lets-pretend-dodd-frank-works-1418343970 [https://perma.cc/DTU7-
BQAD]; see also Victoria McGrane, Wall Street, Banks Press to Shape Dodd-Frank Rules,
WALL ST. J. (April 22, 2011 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704
889404576277364034089104 [https://perma.cc/D5Q2-FU6F]; Gretchen Morgenson, Kicking
Dodd-Frank in the Teeth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/
business/kicking-dodd-frank-in-the-teeth.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P2YJ-JRH6] (“The
114th Congress has been at work for less than a week, but a goal for many of its members
is already evident: a further rollback of regulations put in place to keep markets and Main
Street safe from reckless Wall Street practices.”); Jonathan Weisman & Eric Lipton, In
New Congress, Wall St. Pushes to Undermine Dodd-Frank Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/business/economy/in-new-congress-wall-st-
pushes-to-undermine-dodd-frank-reform.html [https://perma.cc/27G5-MNBX]; Mark A.
Calabria, Mortgage Reform under the Dodd-Frank Act 1 (Cato Inst., Working Paper No.
15, 2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A5WH-EJEX] [hereinafter Mortgage Reform].
203. See Reiss, supra note 186, at 725; Clifford Rossi, Final Qualified Mortgage Rule
Should Get Us Back to Basics, AMERICAN BANKER ( April 11, 2012), http://www.ameri-
canbanker.com/bankthink/final-qualified-mortgage-rule-should-get-us-back-to-basics-
1048282-1.html [https://perma.cc/9PS9](“Creating a final rule that is restrictive in terms of
what constitutes a qualified mortgage has the potential of limiting the scope of available
mortgage products, and thus potentially constraining access to mortgage credit and poten-
tially raising borrowing costs.”).
204. See Mark A. Calabria, On “Regulatory Burdens to Obtaining Mortgage Credit”
(Cato Inst., Working Testimony to the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
2016] Unfinished Business of Dodd-Frank 677
As a number of scholars and consumer advocates have noted, it is still
too early in the process to judge whether credit has been meaningfully
restricted by the CFPB’s new mortgage lending regulations.205 However,
there is at least enough data to show one important thing: lenders are
overwhelmingly choosing to make loans that meet the qualified mortgage
standard. As industry watchers and legal scholars always declare, finan-
cial markets and lending institutions are allergic to risk.206 The possibility
of the imposition of heavy fines and uncertain litigation—not to mention
the inability to off-load newly originated loans on the secondary mort-
gage market and thereby increase access to capital—provides powerful
incentives for mortgage lenders to run toward the qualified mortgage.207
According to the National Association of Realtor’s survey of mortgage
originators, in the fourth quarter of 2015 the national percentage of mort-
gage loans made to borrowers that met the qualified mortgage safe har-
bor was 88.1%, with that number being fairly static compared to the
second and third quarters of 2015.208
Most interestingly, the share of non-qualified mortgage loans—those
that must merely meet the more discretionary “ability to repay” stan-
dard—was a mere 1.5% in the fourth quarter of 2015.209
United States S., April 16, 2015), http://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/regulatory-
burdens-obtaining-mortgage-credit [https://perma.cc/NL99-JZ9Y].
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9DHX-ATVF] (quoting chief economist at Zillow.com Stan Humphries: “The question is,
how much lending activity are we going to see emerge around the Q.M. box?”); see Cala-
bria, Mortgage Reform supra note 202, at 11 (“A goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to elimi-
nate certain products and practices from the mortgage market. So at a very basic level the
choices facing mortgage borrowers will be reduced, the difficult question is in gauging how
much.”).
206. See Joshua Rauh, The Looming Pension Crisis?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2013), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SS4FlZr1ZI [https://perma.cc/G36L-8N48] (noting the ways
in which even global financial markets react to even the most minor of economic
uncertainties.)
207. Floyd Norris, Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/business/mortgages-without-risk-at-least-for-
the-banks.html [https://perma.cc/GZ8H-9M2P] (“There was no single cause of the financial
crisis, but a chief one was surely the way mortgage loans were made by people who be-
lieved they had no reason to care if the loan was repaid. That was why the Dodd-Frank
financial overhaul law included risk retention—called ‘skin in the game’—as a major re-
form.”); see Elizabeth C. Yen, Borrower Suitability Standards for Residential Mortgage
Loans—The Need to Educate Home Buyers and Home Owners About Hidden Risks Asso-
ciated with “Plain Vanilla” Qualified Residential Mortgage Loans, 31 NO. 12 BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 3 (2012).
208. NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, SEVENTH SURVEY OF MORTGAGE ORIGINATORS 2015
2 (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.realtor.org/reports/august-2015-mortgage-originators-survey
[https://perma.cc/4L3A-7NW6].
209. Id.
678 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
This data indicates that the overwhelming share of new home mortgage
borrowers are meeting very rigorous underwriting standards. Their ability
to repay is arguably stronger and more reliable than any borrower in the
recent past—and certainly much more than during the pre-2008 period.
Moreover, these homeowners, like those in the past, can still rely upon a
host of legal protections (ranging from taxation, criminal law, property
law, and tort) that create a favorable environment for homeownership.
But one area remains unchanged and is still unduly harsh for homeown-
ers—the mortgage contract itself.
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III. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF DODD-FRANK:
REFORMING THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT
Dodd-Frank has certainly heralded a new era in financial regulation.210
Indeed, the creation of the CFPB alone has changed the mood of many in
the financial sector.211 Nevertheless, even the Act’s most ardent support-
ers have complained that the law does not go far enough. For instance,
many contend that the legislation’s insufficiency deals with banks that
may become “too big to fail.”212 Similarly, the Act does not address the
“moral hazard” aspects of banking and contains a host of loopholes that
help banks and financial institutes escape some of the more stringent as-
pects of the law.213 The president of the federal reserve bank in Dallas
has been a particular critic of Dodd-Frank’s shortcomings in the way it
deals with systemically important financial institutions: “The credibility of
Dodd–Frank’s disavowal of [too-big-to-fail] will remain in question until
a big financial institution actually fails and the wreckage is quickly re-
moved so the economy doesn’t slow to a halt.”214 Also, noted economists,
Paul Krugman and Robert Schiller, argue that the capital requirements
for depositary institutions are still not high enough and the Act does not
deal in a meaningful way to diminish the systemic risk that is inherent in
the banking system.215 These criticisms are probably best summed up by
Professor Steven Schwarcz, who argues that Dodd-Frank took a
microprudential approach to regulating the financial sector, when the
root causes of the crisis were much more macro in scope, and thus should
have been addressed in a similar fashion.216
210. Susan B. Zaunbrecher, Dodd-Frank Bill Reshapes Businesses, NAT’L L. REV. (July
17, 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/dodd-frank-bill-reshapes-businesses [https:/
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[https://perma.cc/2FK3-EERV].
215. Xaxnar, Krugman on Dodd-Frank, DAILY KOS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.dailykos
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While all of these may be true and reasonable critiques of the law,
there is one significant matter that Dodd-Frank not only fails to meaning-
fully address, but in fact fails to address at all— the standardized residen-
tial mortgage. While the Act changed the way lenders originate loans and
how they underwrite them, including how related derivatives are sold and
traded, it did not address this all important component of the mortgage
credit system.217 In fact, the mortgage contract has remained little
changed since it was first formulated in 1971—almost half a century
ago.218 However, the housing market has indeed changed, and changed
greatly. The way would-be homeowners engage in the home loan process
is vastly different today than when the standard mortgage contract was
first developed.219 Indeed, there were many involved in that early process
who understood the significance of contract harmonization and the im-
pact it would have on the way housing credit works for most Ameri-
cans.220 One such notable individual was Senator Ralph Nader who took
part in the hearings that gave rise to the standardization mortgage and
the secondary market.221 He stated in testimony before the congressional
committee: “What is now a face-to-face relationship between two people
in the same locality will become an impersonal relationship through
agents between a person and a bulk buyer of investment paper.”222 How
right he was and how prophetic were his words. Yet, despite Dodd-
Frank’s vast scope and significance in terms of its reshaping of the Ameri-
can financial landscape, this all-important document was not touched.223
An appraisal of the standardized residential mortgage is part of the
unfinished business of Dodd-Frank. It has been 45 years since its incep-
tion. It is time for lawmakers, housing advocates, policy experts, and the
American public to revisit this central link to the housing economy and
the defining document for homeownership in this country.
A. RECENT ABUSE OF MORTGAGE CONTRACT TERMS
While it is interesting to note the absence of any real attention paid to
the mortgage contract in the wake of the financial and housing crash, one
might argue that it is not altogether surprising. It was the issuance of sub-
prime loans, the false rating of the securitization of those loans, and the
overall economics underlying the housing system that brought about the
crash—not the actual terms of the mortgage contract.224 From this per-
spective, one might think that perhaps the mortgage contract need not be
changed, and so its omission from the Dodd-Frank Act was foreseeable
217. See generally CFR Backgrounders, supra note 212.
218. See supra Part I.B-C and accompanying discussion.
219. See supra Part I.B-C.
220. Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 797–98.
221. Id. at 799-800.
222. Id. at 798-99 (citing Federal National Mortgage Association Public Meeting on Con-
ventional Mortgage Forms: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, S. Doc. No. 92-21, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1971)).
223. See id.
224. See Dibadj, supra note 148, at 94.
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and indeed justified. However, that view would be short-sighted and fails
to recognize the significant role that the mortgage contract has played
and continues to play in the fall-out from the crisis. In fact, a not-so-small
scandal emerged over the past few years in connection with the ways in
which banks, and specifically their third party contractors, utilized the
rights granted to them under the mortgage contract.225 This series of abu-
sive practices has become known as the break-in foreclosure scandal.226
This scandal arose from the aftermath of the housing crisis, where
banks were confronted with an enormous number of properties awaiting
foreclosure.227 Many of these properties could not even be sold at a fore-
closure sale due to their markedly decreased values.228 To aide them in
handling this crisis, banks began to increasingly use third party contrac-
tors—commonly called the mortgage field services industry—to help
them in managing these foreclosed or soon-to-be-foreclosed proper-
ties.229 These companies claimed expertise in the management and pres-
ervation of real property and, as part of their arrangement with the
banks, would take charge of large numbers of distressed properties with a
view toward ensuring that they were being preserved and properly main-
tained.230 The most recognizable of these property preservation contrac-
tors is Safeguard Properties, which has been the subject of most of the
litigation involving these alleged break-in foreclosure practices.231
These property management firms were charged with going to the
mortgaged property, inspecting the premises from the street without en-
tering on to the property, and determining whether the property was still
occupied or if it had been abandoned by the distressed homeowner.232 If
it was determined, in good faith, that the property was abandoned, then
the contractor was charged with securing the premises by “boarding up
the doorway, turning off the water and winterizing the home, and placing
lockboxes or padlocks on the doors.”233 These acts sometimes even in-
volved removing furnishings and other personal effects from the home.234
Moreover, the provision of these services often continued “throughout
the foreclosure process and after the mortgage lender purchase[d] the
property in the foreclosure auction.”235
225. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1161.
226. Id. at 1162.
227. See id. at 1160–61, 1179.
228. See id. at 1179.
229. Id.; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Invasive Tactic in Foreclosures Draws Scru-
tiny, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/invasive-
tactic-in-foreclosures-draws-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/Q7HQ-ZH3Z].
230. Odinet, supra note 16, at 1179.
231. See id. at 1159–62.
232. Ben Hallman, Banks Keep Breaking Into Houses, and Homeowners Are Fighting
Back, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/02/bank-
contractor-lawsuits-safeguard_n_3975574.html [https://perma.cc/5Q2M-CJPV].
233. Complaint at ¶ 34, Illinois v. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., No. 2013-Ch-20175,
2013 WL 5290237 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013).
234. Id. at ¶ 51.
235. Id. at ¶ 35.
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The authority for the lender’s right to inspect and engage in acts of
preservation as it relates to the property is derived from a standard provi-
sion in the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage.236 This clause is quite
broad, far-reaching, and states that if the homeowner intentionally or
negligently allows the mortgaged property to become damaged or to de-
teriorate, then the lender or its representative has the power to enter
onto the premises and remediate.237 Unfortunately, however, there have
been many cases where these clauses were not used in good faith.238 In-
stead, allegations abound that mortgage servicers, through their property
contractors, engaged in much more aggressive and, in many cases, unau-
thorized activities when dealing with these foreclosed properties.239 In
fact, many reports indicate that the determination of occupancy was a
mere pretext for intimidating the homeowner, in addition to reports of
the destruction of personal property, and not to mention the inevitable
feelings of shame and violation that occur as a result of a home break-
in.240
In one report out of Tampa, Florida, a homeowner named Deanna
Tedone stated that she returned home one day to find that a contractor,
sent by her lender U.S. Bank, was smashing holes in the walls of her
house.241 His stated reason for his activities was that he was inspecting
the property for Chinese-drywall on behalf of U.S. Bank, which was seek-
ing to protect its collateral.242 Tedone noted that she had indeed fallen
behind on her mortgage obligations, but neither her bank nor its agent
had contacted her prior to the inspection.243 In the end, the inspector’s
work left debris and rubble scattered about the home.244
In another report, an Illinois homeowner named Majorie Principe al-
leged that she returned home one day to discover that her mortgagee’s
contractor had “taken her furniture, books, savings bonds and electron-
ics.”245 Another homeowner in Cleveland, Ohio, claimed to have been
robbed of his clothing by a property preservation sweep, and an Atlanta
man was actually arrested when he “forced his way back into his home
after a Safeguard contractor locked him out.”246 In the end, it was discov-
236. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1183.
237. Id.
238. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 229; see also Odinet, supra note 16, at 1184–85.
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closure But May Still Lose House, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 1, 2012), http://consumerist.com/
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[https://perma.cc/F29W-68VR].
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ered that the contractor had actually gone to the wrong house!247
Even tenants have been victims. A Missouri woman named Nicole
Corum stated that she came home one evening to discover her home
greatly damaged and all of her belongings missing, including her 7-year
old son’s toys.248 Neighbors reported seeing a worker emptying the house
earlier in the day and, when challenged, the worker stated “I work for
Safeguard deal with them.”249 When Corum contacted Safeguard, she re-
ported that they told her that all her things were “out in the dump” and
that the company was not in the business of keeping things resulting from
a preservation inspection in storage.250
These stories have continued even into 2015,251 which is not surprising
considering the lack of any real regulation of the mortgage field services
industry and little industry standards regarding the use of contractors by
banks.252 “Over the past several years since the outbreak of the housing
foreclosure crisis over two hundred fifty lawsuits have been filed against
various property preservation firms, and these cases span across thirty-
one states.”253 In fact, in 2013, the attorney general of Illinois filed a law-
suit against Safeguard Properties in connection with a long string of suc-
cessive break-in-style foreclosure actions spanning across that state based
on the state’s consumer fraud act.254 And all of these stories stem from
one single clause found in the standard mortgage contract. As Senator
Ralph Nader noted in the committee hearings in the 1970s, the standard
residential mortgage granted too much power to lenders, specifically “the
power to invade the consumer’s home for any reason, or no reason at
247. Id.
248. See Heather Catallo, Some Homeowners in Foreclosure Lose Belongings after
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all.”255 Indeed, his prophetic words have come true as the break-in fore-
closure crisis continues to this day to infect the housing recovery.256
B. REFORM IN THE PRIVATE LABEL RMBS MARKET
Aside from break-in foreclosure abuses and the simple lapse of time
since there has been any meaningful review of the Fannie Mae/Freddie
Mac mortgage, there is yet another significant reason why a reappraisal is
more important now than ever: the private label mortgage securities mar-
ket is undertaking its own independent efforts to create mortgage con-
tract standardization.257
The private label mortgage sector is a financial marketplace for the
buying and selling of mortgage loans that do not meet the requirements
necessary for purchase by the GSEs, known as “non-conforming
loans.”258 Because they lack conforming features, they are not eligible for
a government guarantee of insurance and therefore are significantly risk-
ier than their conforming cousin loans.259 Such loans usually are made to
borrowers with very low credit scores, have negative amortization sched-
ules, and are given with little documentation (low-doc) or with a very
high loan amount (jumbo loans).260 The appeal to investors who purchase
non-conforming loans on the private label market is the possibility of
high returns.261 In order to gauge the amount of risk of these products,
investors resorted to using ratings agencies from the past.262 Unfortu-
nately for these investors, the ratings agencies grossly over rated these
investments leading up to 2008, and when the housing bubble crashed,
investors took heavy losses.263 Since then, some private label commercial
mortgage-backed securities have seen an uptick in activity, but the resi-
dential private label mortgage-backed securities market basically remains
dead.264
However, a financial trade association called the Structured Finance
Industry Group, which is “focused on improving and strengthening the
broader structured finance and securitization market” recently launched
efforts to re-invigorate the private label market for residential mortgage-
255. See Carrozzo, supra note 58, at 799.
256. See Odinet, supra note 16, at 1212–13.
257. See Structured Finance Industry Group, RMBS 3.0—A Comprehensive Set of Pro-
posed Industry Standards to Promote Growth in the Private Label Securities Market (6 Aug
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backed securities (RMBS).265 The report notes that in order for the
RMBS market to move beyond the shock of the housing crisis, “members
must tackle the difficult but critical task of creating standardized repre-
sentations, warranties, and repurchase enforcement mechanisms” that are
so critical to the effective operations of this market.266 Indeed, the private
label securities market appears to be on the verge of doing exactly what
Congress and the GSEs did in the 1970s—creating standardization in
RMBS transactions, but this time in the private label market.267
The report notes that, much like prior to the standard Fannie Mae/
Freddie Mac mortgage, in the RMBS market, “divergence among the va-
rious approaches has significantly influenced rating agency decisions and
limited investor participation.”268 Standardization, at least to some signif-
icant extent, is essential in creating a robust secondary market for private
label mortgage securities backed by residential property.269 The industry
model standards outlined in the report make suggestions on streamlining
representations and warranties dealing with fraud,270 regulatory and con-
sumer protection compliance,271 no encroachments and zoning compli-
ance,272 and disclosure of loan underwriting guidelines, among many
others.273
The model provisions discussed above admittedly do little directly in
the way of residential borrowers. Instead, they address the variance in the
forms and contracts used between issuers and investors in the RMBS pri-
vate label market.274 The Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform mortgage, on
the other hand, is the link between the originator/future holders and the
borrower, therefore, its provisions are of great importance.275 Neverthe-
less, there is significance in the RMBS industry’s recent efforts. They are
preparing for a resurgence in the RMBS market and, as such, are laying
265. See RMBS 3.0, supra note 257, at n.1.
266. Id. at 1.
267. Id. (“Most industry participants seem to believe that, without a targeted effort at
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269. See id. at 2.
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no fraud representation was made by certain parties. This system created a lack of stand-
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limited market volume and a limited number of post-crisis issuers and RMBS
transactions.”).
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the ground-work for a market-wide contractual framework that contem-
plates fairer terms, more even-handed representations and warranties,
and more acceptable disclosures.276 In other words, there is an effort to
bring the private label market players together to work out how the post-
financial crisis RMBS market will operate.277
Dodd-Frank was the post-financial crisis workout for much of the fi-
nancial industry.278 However, it did not go through the same exercise of
reevaluating the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage
contract. As the data above indicates, the vast majority of new residential
mortgage loan originations are conforming loans (indeed, there is little if
any activity at all in the RMBS market) coming in the form of qualified
mortgages (i.e., those with quite strict underwriting).279 Why then has
there not been a discussion of the mortgage contract in the context of the
GSE-dominated secondary market? If the RMBS industry is getting its
house in order and reevaluating the terms that govern some of their most
important legal relationships, then so too should the GSEs when it comes
to the standardized residential mortgage.280 If the financial crisis taught
us nothing else, it was how dangerous it can be to leave the private sector
to its own devices in an area so tied to government participation and so
important to public life and society as the financing of homeownership.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of these factors, the time has come for the GSEs, housing advo-
cates, and industry players to undertake a serious and informed review of
the standard residential mortgage—a document now nearly fifty years
old.281 A fresh look is warranted for a number of compelling reasons.
First, today’s home loan borrowers are made to undergo a more stringent
and scrutinizing underwriting process than ever before.282 Indeed, today
only the most credit worthy of borrowers can become homeowners.283
Recent industry data shows that mortgage originators are nearly 100% of
the time issuing only qualified mortgage loans to new homeowners. With
such a change in the way loans are made on the frontend, a more tem-
pered mortgage contract is merited.
Second, at least some of the provisions in the standard mortgage con-
tract—mainly the property preservation clause—have been at the heart
of a recent, nation-wide foreclosure scandal.284 The break-in foreclosure
activity that has cropped up across the country has been on the front page
of many major newspapers and has spurred litigation in a majority of the
276. See generally RMBS 3.0, supra note 257, at 1–4.
277. Id.
278. Supra Part II.B.
279. See supra Part II.C and accompanying chart.
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states.285 Even the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has taken note of these abuses and the
fact that there is almost no regulation of property contractors used by
banks in the foreclosure crisis.286 While reforming the mortgage contract
would not systemically change the mortgage field services industry, it
does have the potential to diminish the chances for abuse by getting to
the source of the bank’s authority to deal with the mortgaged properties
prior to foreclosure.287 A change in the property preservation provision
of the standard mortgage contract could help mitigate future scandals of
this type.
Lastly, the reform activities currently underway in the private label
mortgage market, specifically with RMBS transactions, should serve as an
impetus for GSE secondary market leaders to also reevaluate their cur-
rent practices and standardized forms. As the private label market looks
to harmonize their contracts and processes so as to balance the interests
of issuers and investors, so too should Fannie, Freddie, and related inter-
est holders look to reevaluate their processes—specifically through the
lens of the mortgage contract—to ensure that fairness, equity, and mod-
ernized best practices remain at the forefront of the home loan process.
The following discussion focuses on three provisions found in the stan-
dard residential mortgage contract that might serve as a starting point for
such discussions. Although there are arguments to advance on all sides
regarding whether these provisions should be kept, reformed, or scrapped
altogether, this article hopes to begin a discussion of what reforms might
be possible in order to better balance the rights of homeowners and mort-
gage lenders.
1. Creditor’s Unilateral Right of Entry
The first provision is perhaps the most egregious because it allows the
lender to unilaterally enter the property of the homeowner for the vague
purpose of making an “inspection.”288 The only limitation of this right is
that the inspection must be reasonable in time and manner.289 Impor-
tantly, there is no requirement that the lender actually notify the home-
owner that such an inspection will take place.290 Regardless of the fact
that the borrower is current on his monthly payments and otherwise in
conformity with other obligations under the loan, in the event the lender
decides an inspection is needed, it may send its agents to physically come
285. Id. at 1168.
286. See FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, AUDIT REP. NO. 2014-012, FHFA OVERSIGHT
ENTERPRISE CONTROLS OVER PRE-FORECLOSURE PROPERTY INSPECTIONS 2 (2014),
https://origin.www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2014-012.pdf [https://perma.cc/APV3-
Q56D].
287. See id. at 3.
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FORM INSTRUMENT, FORM 3033 § 7(B), p. 9, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/3033-
NewYorkMortgage.doc [https://perma.cc/E9E6-YQBJ] [hereinafter N.Y. MORTGAGE].
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on to the property and conduct the examination.291 The following provi-
sion describes the right:
Lender’s Inspection of Property. Lender, and others authorized by
Lender, may enter on and inspect the Property. They will do so in a
reasonable manner and at reasonable times. If it has a reasonable
purpose, Lender may inspect the inside of the home or other im-
provements on the Property. Before or at the time an inspection is
made, Lender will give me notice stating a reasonable purpose for
such interior inspection.292
What would perhaps shock most homeowners is the second part of this
clause—that the lender also has the ability to inspect the inside of the
home and other improvements on the property.293 The thought that the
lender, without being prompted by a default or other failure to abide by
the terms of the mortgage, has the unilateral right to enter a one’s home,
garage, or other improvement would, and should, shock most homeown-
ers. However, the clause does provide that the homeowner must be pro-
vided notice of such an “interior inspection,” but the provision gives no
minimum time frame for such notice.294 Rather, the notice can even be
made “at the time an inspection is made” which is tantamount to no no-
tice at all.295 Additionally, the provision does not provide how long
before the inspection the notice must be given, rather it merely must be
beforehand, at some point.296 Can it be the same day or a mere few
hours? The mortgage does not give an answer.297 Rather, the provision is
geared entirely in favor of the lender and is at its discretion.
The unspoken truth behind this clause is the notion that the borrower
cannot be trusted with the home. In other words, the lender should have
the right to inspect the property at will because the borrower surely can-
not be relied upon to maintain the property and keep it in good repair.298
Thrown to the wind is the notion that the property serves as the dwelling
place and abode of the borrower—a concept that is given great policy and
legal weight under various provisions of American law.
Therefore, this provision should be eliminated entirely. Absent some
breach on behalf of the borrower—whether in monthly payments or
other obligations in the mortgage—the lender should not have the ability
to interfere with the possessory rights of the homeowner. If borrowers
are required to meet such rigorous underwriting criteria on the front end,
then provisions like these that assume the worst about the borrower (i.e.,
that she would have no care or reliable reason to keep her property in
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tainly has an interest in assuring that his collateral is maintained, collat-
eral that constitutes a home is due treatment different from collateral on
a commercial property. The status of the property as the dwelling place of
the individual merits different treatment and a heightened level of
respect.
2. Debtor’s Mandatory Escrow Requirements
The next provision deals with the borrower’s obligation to escrow vari-
ous payments with the lender that are ancillary to the obligation to repay
the loan itself.299 Naturally, the borrower must make monthly payments
of principal and interest in accordance with the loan’s payment schedule.
But the borrower’s obligations under this provision go far beyond that.300
He must make monthly advances to his lender in amounts necessary to
pay for property taxes, any municipal or other assessments, utility charges
for sewer and water, property and flood insurance, and even neighbor-
hood association dues.301
Moreover, the lender need not require such payments from the start.302
Rather, at any point during the term of the loan the lender may decide to
include these sundry expenses as part of the borrower’s monthly payment
obligations.303 And importantly, the lender is the one with the authority
to set the estimates that determine the amount of the monthly pay-
ments.304 Although it is true that the lender is limited by various federal
laws and regulations, such as the Real Estate Settlement Procures Act,305
from holding large amounts in escrow, the power is still very much in the
hands of the lender in making these determinations and any adjustments
over time.306 The following provision describes the escrow requirements
of the borrower:
Monthly Payments For Taxes And Insurance.
(a) Borrower’s Obligations. I will pay to Lender all amounts neces-
sary to pay for taxes, assessments, water charges, sewer rents and
other similar charges, ground leasehold payments or rents (if any),
hazard or property insurance covering the Property, flood insurance
(if any), and any required Mortgage Insurance, or a Loss Reserve as
described in Section 10 in the place of Mortgage Insurance. Each
Periodic Payment will include an amount to be applied toward pay-
ment of the following items which are called “Escrow Items:”
(1) The taxes, assessments, water charges, sewer rents and other
similar charges, on the Property which under Applicable Law
may be superior to this Security Instrument as a Lien on the
Property. Any claim, demand or charge that is made against
299. See id. at 5.
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property because an obligation has not been fulfilled is known as
a “Lien;”
(2) The leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property (if
any);
(3) The premium for any and all insurance required by Lender
under Section 5 of this Security Instrument;
(4) The premium for Mortgage Insurance (if any);
(5) The amount I may be required to pay Lender under Section
10 of this Security Instrument instead of the payment of the pre-
mium for Mortgage Insurance (if any); and
(6) If required by Lender, the amount for any Community Asso-
ciation Dues, Fees, and Assessments.
After signing the Note, or at any time during its term, Lender may
include these amounts as Escrow Items. The monthly payment I will
make for Escrow Items will be based on Lender’s estimate of the
annual amount required.307
It is worth noting that federal law has dealt with escrow requirements
both before and after Dodd-Frank. For instance, many FHA loans have
mandatory escrow requirements.308 Also, Regulation Z, which interprets
the Truth in Lending Act, requires lenders to establish escrow accounts
for certain high-priced residential mortgage loans.309 However, many of
these rules only require a one-year escrow period. The CFPB issued a
rule in January 2013 that modified the Regulation Z requirement in two
ways.310 First, it extended that time period from one to five years.311 Sec-
ond, it exempted certain mortgage loans from the escrow requirement—
those in rural areas, made to underserved communities, and those made
by small volume or low-asset mortgage lenders.312 Otherwise, it is up to
the lender to decide whether to escrow certain amounts. And, as the pro-
vision above indicates, nearly all residential lenders do so.313
However, if the mortgage borrowers of today are required to show a
certain level of financial sophistication in the way of their credit-worthi-
ness—evidence one might persuasively argue is indicative of an ability to
manage one’s own money and financial obligations effectively—then the
need for escrow requirements seems overly burdensome and heavy-
handed. For instance, a homeowner might have valid financial reasons for
wanting, for instance, to make lump sum payments of certain charges
when they come due, rather than paying in monthly installments into an
307. Id. at 5–6.
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escrow account. Having access to significant portions of capital for emer-
gencies and being able to save and plan or prepare for large expenses is
representative of good financial management. Hence, if the borrower
must essentially show that he has these skills during the underwriting re-
view period, then he should similarly be accorded the benefit of doing the
same with his periodic charges thereafter.
That is not to say that some or even many borrowers may not still de-
sire to avail themselves of escrow arrangements with their lenders. In-
deed, the convenience is attractive since the borrower need only pay the
set amount each month and thereafter not worry about whether various
charges (property taxes, insurance, etc.) are paid. But on the other hand,
there are likely some borrowers who would like to control and have ac-
cess to those amounts that would otherwise be escrowed. They might
rather plan accordingly to make proper payments at the time they are
due. Therefore, borrowers should have the choice as to whether to escrow
certain amounts, thereby giving some autonomy to the borrower, while
still maintaining the convenience that escrow arrangements can provide.
3. Creditor’s Expansive Rights Upon Default
Last, but not least, are the provisions of the mortgage contract that
speak to the rights of the lender upon a default or other failure to comply
on the part of the borrower.314 Unlike the other provisions discussed
above that apply regardless of a default, the clauses shown below are de-
signed to shift the power and control between the parties as it pertains to
the property itself, once the nature of the relationship between the bor-
rower and the lender become directly adverse.315 Indeed, the most obvi-
ous example of such a change in position is a monetary default by the
borrower (i.e., a missed monthly payment).
However, as indicated below, the rights that spring to life in favor of
the lender under these clauses do not merely hinge on a monetary de-
fault.316 Rather, the language is more broadly drafted to include the vio-
lation of any and all “promises and agreements” and includes triggers,
such as the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the mere pendency of pro-
ceedings by third parties claiming an interest in the property on par or
exceeding the lender’s mortgage, or proceedings for the enforcement of
municipal liens.317 Abandonment of the property, regardless of the time-
liness of payments or other obligations, also triggers these rights.318 If
there is any such failure, a default occurs, and a host of rights—many of
which are extremely aggressive and overreaching—become available to
the lender:
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Lender’s Right to Protect Its Rights in The Property. If: (a) I do not
keep my promises and agreements made in this Security Instrument;
(b) someone, including me, begins a legal proceeding that may signif-
icantly affect Lender’s interest in the Property or rights under this
Security Instrument (such as a legal proceeding in bankruptcy, in
probate, for Condemnation or Forfeiture (as defined in Section 11),
proceedings which could give a Person rights which could equal or
exceed Lender’s interest in the Property or under this Security In-
strument, proceedings for enforcement of a Lien which may become
superior to this Security Instrument, or to enforce laws or regula-
tions); or (c) I have abandoned the Property, then Lender may do
and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect
Lender’s interest in the Property and Lender’s rights under this Se-
curity Instrument.
Lender’s actions may include, but are not limited to: (a) protecting
and/or assessing the value of the Property; (b) securing and/or re-
pairing the Property; (c) paying sums to eliminate any Lien against
the Property that may be equal or superior to this Security Instru-
ment; (d) appearing in court; and (e) paying reasonable attorneys’
fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this
Security Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Lender can also enter the Property to make repairs,
change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water
from pipes, eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous
conditions, have utilities turned on or off, and take any other action
to secure the Property. Although Lender may take action under this
Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is under no duty to do
so. I agree that Lender will not be liable for not taking any or all
actions under this Section 9.319
Such broad contractual authority includes the power to “do and pay for
whatever is reasonable and appropriate to protect the Lender’s interest in
the Property,” which leaves much to the creditor’s discretion.320 Conve-
niently, the provision provides an illustrative list of such “reasonable”
acts—lest one think such authority is limited—which include the vague
power to “protect” the value of the asset and secure and repair the prop-
erty.321 Interestingly, the duty to give notice before entering the premises
is dispensed with, as the clause allows the lender to enter and change
locks, board up windows, turn off the utilities, and “take any other ac-
tion” to secure the property.322 Indeed, what broader authority could a
lender desire? And notably all of this power devolves to the lender prior
to any foreclosure proceedings.323
The triggering of this clause, which according to the language of the
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amounts to a forfeiture of the borrower’s possessory rights in the prop-
erty.324 It is worth remembering that this is not merely any random prop-
erty of the borrower. Rather, this is his home, his dwelling, his abode. It is
the place his family resides, where he seeks sanctuary, and where he
shares the most intimate moments of life. This immediate, harsh, and rel-
atively unpredictable bundle of rights in favor of the lender is
troublesome.
While a lender surely must be vested with the tools it needs to preserve
its collateral in the event of a default, the scope and potency of the rights
described in this clause go too far.325 Such provisions should be narrowly
tailored to identify the trigger of the aforementioned powers. Those pow-
ers should be limited to only the most severe kinds of defaults after
proper notice is given. Lenders must take into account the human ele-
ment—the violative nature of intrusion upon one’s home.
CONCLUSION
Much remains to be explored and written in the ever-changing world of
mortgage lending. The credit box remains small, and the opportunities for
many Americans, particularly for blacks, Hispanics, and low-income
groups, remain few and far between.326 Moreover, with Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac under what appears to be a perpetual conservatorship
(which includes frequent capital sweeps from the Treasury Department of
their reserves327), the secondary market is anything but settled.328 What is
certain is that we will see a continued evolution in mortgage credit in the
United States, which will hopefully be driven by the goals of consumer
protection, safety and soundness, and access to credit and
homeownership.
324. See N.Y. MORTGAGE, supra note 288.
325. See id. at 5–6, 9–10.
326. James H. Carr, Outdated Credit Scoring Models Shut Minorities Out of Housing
Market, FORBES (April 9, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2015/
04/09/outdated-credit-scoring-models-shut-minorities-out-of-housing-market/#1ca09f8c63
82 [https://perma.cc/88DD-5J3T]; LAURA SULLIVAN ET AL., INST. FOR ASSETS & SOC.
POL’Y, BRANDEIS UNIV., THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP: WHY POLICY MATTERS 1 (2015),
http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/2015/RWA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW5P-PQMF]; LAURIE
GOODMAN, JUN ZHU & TAZ GEORGE, WHERE HAVE ALL THE LOANS GONE? THE IM-




327. Clea Benson & Jody Shenn, Fannie-Freddie Profit Sweep Defended by Key Trea-
sury Adviser, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2015-03-05/fannie-freddie-profit-sweep-defended-as-treasury-seeks-wind-down
[https://perma.cc/8PMG-T7AB].
328. Gretchen Morgenson, A Revolving Door Helps Big Banks’ Quiet Campaign to
Muscle Out Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/07/business/a-revolving-door-helps-big-banks-quiet-campaign-to-muscle-out-fannie-
and-freddie.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XTG5-ETVU]; Jim Parrott & Mark Zandi, Fixing
Fannie and Freddie for Good, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/15/opinion/fixing-fannie-and-freddie-for-good.html [https://perma.cc/P3JS-UXGL].
694 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
As we continue to have these public discussions about Dodd-Frank and
the regulation of mortgage lending more broadly, this Article argues that
we should also consider the importance of including in these conversa-
tions a reappraisal of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac standard mortgage. In
many ways this document does not reflect the current state of consumer
credit relations when it comes to housing. Several of its provisions are
overreaching, have been abused, and represent a mistrustful view of
homeowners. This document is fundamental and deserves a careful re-
view and input from the public. Indeed, it is the unfinished business of
mortgage lending reform, and because it lies at the heart of homeowner-
ship in America, it is certainly worthy of a second look.
